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THE USE OF CREAM IN THE INVESTIGATION OF HUMAN ERROR IN AVIATION EVENTS:
A CASE STUDY
Rome, F. ; Fabre, D. ; Cabon, P.
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Ergonomie – Comportement et Interactions (EA 4070) - Université Paris Descartes
Paris, France
Laporte-Wullens, I ; Figarol, S.
DGAC/SDER
Toulouse, France
To investigate Human Factors issues of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), a part-task
simulation has been conducted. The analysis method employed was based on the CREAM principles and included
the following steps: Predictive analysis, Simulations, Data analysis, Retrospective analysis. The project called
"ARCADES", presented in this paper, concerns the errors identification and research of causes. The collective
work based on CREAM is composed of four steps alternating between work in pairs and plenary session: the
events identification and classification, consensus on the events to be analyzed, the retrospective analysis, and the
mutual analysis. The work group was composed of pilots, controllers, investigators and Human Factors experts.
The analysis was based on the data collected during the simulations: video recordings, questionnaires, audio
recording of debriefing. Concerning the identification step, results show the interest of the clear distinction
between causes and consequences, as it exists in CREAM. Indeed, it enables to bind the analysts to objectivity in
the identification and the calling of the events. Inter-pairs variability remains important for the three scenarios
studied. Participants agreed on the interest of the method concerning the search of causes. The method enables to
pursue analyses more deeply and more exhaustively, results show that the method guides towards
systemic causes. Results also emphasize the complementarity of different points of view and the interest of a
collective approach.
Introduction
To investigate Human Factors issues of the Traffic
Alert  and  Collision  Avoidance  System  (TCAS),  a
part-task simulation has been conducted with 18
airline pilots and 18 air traffic controllers (Rome,
2006). A main hypothesis of this study was that
wrong reactions to TCAS resolutions might be due
to time pressure and stress. The use of simulation
has ensured to re-create the conditions which
modify the state of the operators (pilots and
controllers) and thus might impact their
performance. One of the requirements of the study
was then to develop an adequate observation and
analysis method that might take into account the
operational and psychological context. The method
employed was based on the CREAM (Cognitive
Reliability and Error analysis Method, Hollnagel,
1998) principles and included the following steps:
Predictive analysis, Simulations, Data analysis,
Retrospective analysis. The usefulness of CREAM
has particularly appeared for the definition of the
protocol and the data collection: video camera
recordings are used for task analysis, questionnaires
are filled in after each scenario and debriefings are
carried out using a self-confrontation technique,
together with pilots and controllers.
A preliminary analysis of the collected data has
emphasized the need for a collective work with
Human Factors experts and operational experts. For
errors identification and research of causes, it has
thus been decided to conduct a new project called
ARCADES (Analyse Retrospective des CAuses Des
Erreurs De l’Experimentation Stress).
Objectives
ARCADES study contains two main objectives:
The first one is to perform a retrospective analysis on
the data collected during the simulations. The
premise  is  that  some  of  the  erroneous  actions
observed during the simulations are relevant to what
could happen in the real life. Understanding the
context and the multiple causes of these erroneous
actions could enable to establish recommendations in
order to limit hazardous consequences.
The second objective is to perform a first explanatory
study on the possibility of using some
CREAM principles in the analyses of aviation
incidents or accidents.
This paper presents the method used for ARCADES
and discusses the results obtained.
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Method
The  main  principle  of  the  employed  method  is  a
collective work based on CREAM. The demarche is
composed of four steps alternating between work in
pairs and plenary session.
Step 1 - Work in pairs - The events identification and
classification. According to CREAM definition and
since the study is focused on TCAS issues,
participants are given this instruction: "An event is
something  that  did  not  go  as  expected  during  a
sequence with a TCAS event (Traffic advisory and/or
Resolution Advisory)". To help them in this
specification, expected actions have been defined
according to airline procedures and air traffic
regulations. For each scenario, by pairs, participants
identify the events and then classify them following
CREAM classification.
To classify the events, CREAM classification
provides four categories of error modes:
- Action of wrong type,
- Action at wrong time,
- Action at wrong place,
- Action at wrong object.
The  main  aim  of  this  step  is  to  be  as  objective  as
possible. Thus instructions are given to participants
to base their classification on observable elements
without inference.
Step 2 - Plenary session - Consensus on the events to
be analyzed. After a presentation of each work in
pairs, a mutual agreement has to be obtained on a list
of events that have to be further analyzed.
Step 3 - Work in pairs.  The retrospective analysis
This step is intended to the retrospective analysis
proper. CREAM provides a classification scheme
which establishes causes-consequences links between
the different elements. The method is recursive; the
analysis doesn't end with the first antecedent.
Antecedents of this antecedent are studied and so on.
The resulting analysis is then like a tree with multiple
paths. The method includes an end point which
enables to stop the iterations when probable causes of
events have been determined.
Step 4 - Plenary session – Mutual analysis. This
ultimate step consists in the establishment of a final
analysis based on the precedent work in pairs.
As an agreement might sometimes be difficult to be
obtained, an option is to proceed by vote. For each
analysis element, participants can adopt it, eliminate
it or keep it with an "?" specifying that they'd need
more information to decide.
Sample
For ARCADES study, the work group was composed
of 8 participants: pilots, controllers, investigators and
Human Factors experts.
The analysis was based on the data collected during
the 10-minute real-time simulations: video
recordings, questionnaires, audio recording of
debriefing.
A total of 6 sessions was conducted over a duration
of 7 months and during which 16 erroneous actions
from 4 different simulations were identified and
analyzed.
Results
Step 1. Table 1 depicts the events identified by each
pair for each scenario as well as their classification.
The percentage represents the proportion of pairs
who have chosen an element; for instance, for the
first  line,  2  pairs  out  of  4  have  identified  the  event
(50%). One pair (out of 4) classifies it as a wrong
action (25%) and the other as a wrong movement
type (25%). This table shows that for the first step, a
rather high variability exists between the pairs,
especially for the first scenario.
Step 2.  Table 2 presents the events resulting from
the consensus for each scenario. For each event, the
concerned actor (the Pilot Flying, the Pilot Not
Flying or the Controller) is indicated as well as his
type of activity.
As expected, all the controllers' erroneous actions are
linked to communication activity. This is also the
case for the Pilot Not Flying. Erroneous actions
linked to this activity correspond principally to
omissions (timing or sequence) and timing errors
(communication given too early or too late). Some
commission errors have been classified as wrong
actions since they are not specified in the procedures
or even worst forbidden in the regulations.
Difficulties have been reported by participants
concerning the classification of phraseology errors.
This type of errors does not concern the presence or
absence of a communication nor the moment at
which it is given but rather the contents of a message.
Participants have, for instance, difficulties to classify
ambiguous notifications of the TCAS resolutions.
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Table 1.  Events and classification





















































































S1 Evt5 X X 2 50% 25% 25%
S1 Evt1 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt10 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt11 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt2 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt3 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt4 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt6 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt7 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt8 X 1 25% 25%
S1 Evt9 X 1 25% 25%
S2 Evt12 X X X X 4 100% 75% 25%
S2 Evt15 X X X X 4 100% 100%
S2 Evt17 X X X X 4 100% 75% 25%
S2 Evt18 X X X 3 75% 75%
S2 Evt13 X X 2 50% 50%
S2 Evt14 X X 2 50% 25% 25%
S2 Evt16 X 1 25%
S2 Evt19 X 1 25% 25%
S3 Evt24 X X X 3 100% 33% 67%
S3 Evt25 X X X 3 100% 67% 33%
S3 Evt20 X X 2 67%
S3 Evt21 X X 2 67%
S3 Evt22 X 1 33% 33%
S3 Evt23 X 1 33% 33%
S3 Evt26 X 1 33% 33%
S3 Evt27 X 1 33% 33%
S3 Evt28 X 1 33% 33%
S3 Evt29 X 1 33% 33%
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Table 2.  Events resulting from consensus
Sc Actors Title Classification Activity
S3 CTL No trafic inf. Timing / omission Communication
S3 CTL Info too late Too late Communication
S3 CTL Inadapted answer Wrong action Communication
S2 CTL Instruction ATC RA Wrong action Communication
S2 PF No proc on 2e TA Sequence / omission Execution
S2 PF High vario Too far Execution
S1 PF No following of RA Too late Execution
S1 PF Avoiding man. Wrong action Execution
S3 PNF No CoC not. Sequence / omission Communication
S3 PNF No  "TCAS tu pilotes Timing / omission Communication
S2 PNF CoC Not defore CoC Too early Communication
S3 PNF Delay of 27s RA / RAnot. Too late Communication
S3 PNF Delay of 27s RA / RAnot. Too late Communication
S2 PNF "TCAS alert" Wrong action Communication
S3 PNF "traffic resolution" Wrong object Communication
S2 PNF /PF Comm .PNF/ PF Wrong action Communication
Step 3. Results of the third step are a tree of causes-
consequences links for each event, for each pair.
This represents a total of 56 trees of causes-
consequences links.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent a quantitative
synthesis of these analyses. The average agreements
have been calculated as follows. For each event, for
each element selected by at least one pair, a
percentage has been calculated: number of pairs who
have selected the element/total number of pairs. The
averages have then been calculated, per event
(Figure 1) and per element (Figure 2). Resulting
values enable to make comparisons inter-elements
and inter-events.
























Figure 1.  Step 3 - % of agreement /event






































































Figure 2.  Step 3 – Higher % of agreement /element
As  shown  by Figure 1, average agreements vary
among events from 30% up to 60%. Figure 2 shows
the element for which the average agreement is
higher. It concerns particularly cognitive failures
(Wrong identification, Faulty diagnosis), training
aspects (insufficient skills, lack of training) and
procedures issues.
Step 4. The result of this step is for each scenario,
one tree of causes – consequences links for each
selected event.
Thus, for each scenario, an analysis has been written
based on the selected elements. Figure 3 presents an
extract of this.
Answering to the controller's instruction, the PNF declares 'OK clear of conflict"
whereas he is still in RA "Monitor Vertical speed". This notification, coming too early
has been qualified as action at wrong time/timing/too early.
It can be attributed to an erroneous (Faulty Diagnosis) followed by an inadequate
plan (Inadequate Plan).
The crew might indeed consider that it is the end of the conflict. Complementary
assessments should be necessary to confirm the erroneous interpretation of the "Monitor
Vertical Speed" and of the controller's notification (Error in mental model, cognitive
bias, Wrong identification).
Figure 3. Extract of the written analyses based on
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CREAM elements
Results can also be analysed in a more quantitative way:
The Figure 4 synthesizes results by keeping the links
between causes and their antecedents. The first
column corresponds to the first level of antecedents
(directly linked to the error mode); it indicates the
number of times an element has been chosen at this
level. Then, the number indicated for each element in
the second column represents the number of times the





















Lack of training: 1
Temporary incapacitation: 3
Inadequate quality control: 2
Design failure: 5






Error in mental model: 3
Mislearning: 1
Wrong identification: 5























This representation enables to identify paths of
causes-consequences links which occur frequently
among the analyses:
– Many errors have been attributed to an
"Inadequate Plan" and a "Faulty Diagnosis". This
emphasizes the fact that during TCAS events, errors
are not necessarily due to a difficulty of the action to
be done but rather to difficulties in the understanding
of the situation and the selection of the action that has
to be performed. Situation awareness issues might be
due to difficulties in the cue identification which can
be related to design issues.
– The difficulties in the selection of action
might emphasize insufficient training.
– Results emphasize possible inadequate
procedure which might have initially been
inadequately designed and not controlled in the actual
context of TCAS events.
This representation emphasizes CREAM benefits, the
approach enables to go beyond the cognitive failures
and identify organisational (training) and technical
(inadequate technical procedure) causes.
These elements are also illustrated by the comparison
presented on the Figure 5. These graphics represent
the proportion of the selected antecedents for the
three categories Human, Technology, Organization at
the first level (directly linked to the error mode) at
the last level (causes). Antecedents related to the
category "human" represent 69% at the first level and













Figure 5. Comparison of the categories of the
antecedents – First and Last levels
Discussion
Steps 1 and 2 – events identification and
classification. Concerning the identification step,
results show the interest of the clear distinction
between causes and consequences, as it exists in
CREAM.  Indeed,  it  enables  to  bind  the  analysts  to
objectivity in the identification and the calling of
the events.
Inter-pairs variability remains important for the three
scenarios studied. Several elements can explain this:
– The detail level can vary among analysts.
For instance, a lack in the procedure following during
a TCAS event can be considered as a single event or
as several ones.
– The consequences generally constitute a
start point of analysis. In the context of the study
(simulations) the absence of consequences is also a
variability factor.
– Finally, the own definition of what is an event
can lead to some questionings. Events are defined
objectively compared with a referential. An approach
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based on a referential only defined by the procedures
would resemble that of people in charge of quality for
whom as says Amalberti (2004)"the deviation from the
referential […] is the source of risk measure", this
implies that "the following of the procedures is the
guarantee of the final performance". This asks the
question of the subjectivity of the referential.
Whereas the variability is important for the first step,
the consensus was obtained relatively easily.
Considering only observable and objective elements
at this step enables to facilitate the jointly work and
to obtain an agreement.
CREAM proposes a classification of the erroneous
actions in four categories: « action at wrong time »,
« action at wrong place », « action of wrong type »,
« action at wrong object ». This classification is
ought to classify erroneous actions without
interpretation. On the whole, participants have
emphasized the interest of the method at this level of
analysis even if some difficulties have been reported.
The absence of execution of an action, i.e. an
omission, constitutes without any doubt the more
salient error when reported to an expected error. In the
CREAM classification, an omission can either
correspond to a timing error ("An action that was not
done at all within the time interval allowed") or
correspond to a sequence error ("An action that was
not carried out. This includes in particular the omission
of  the  last  action  of  a  series").  This  distinction  easily
comprehensible in theory has led to some difficulties
when it has come to apply it to an action.
Whereas the omission errors are identified
objectively, the classification of commission errors
can be more delicate. If we consider in particular, this
type of error "Action at wrong time/timing/too late",
declare that an action has been performed too late or
too early necessitate defining an acceptable delay for
this action. The need of the definition of a nominal
situation referring to the whole TCAS sequence has
then appeared. This is particularly the example of the
resolutions notifications performed nearly at the end
of the resolution.
For another part, results show that CREAM takes
hardly into account aspects linked to cooperation
such as communication in the cockpit and between
the air and the ground. Communication issues are
not expressed clearly in the proposed error
modes, especially. This concerns especially the
ambiguous communications.
Step 3 and Step 4 – Retrospective analysis.
Participants agreed on the interest of the method
concerning the search of causes. The method enables
to pursue analyses more deeply and more
exhaustively. Finally, results show that the method
guides  towards  systemic  causes  as  shown  by  the
evolution of the proportion of antecedents linked to
organisational and technical problems between the
first and the last levels of analysis.
Variability remains important at this step. This can be
due especially to the detail level of the data and to the
necessary inferences. Besides, participants have
emphasized the lack of adequacy CREAM to the
aeronautic sector. They especially have expressed the
necessity to add new links concerning stress, fear which
can explain the performance variability during TCAS
events. They also have pointed the difficulty to specify
technical aspects of the TCAS, such as inadequate
threshold and false alarms. Finally, participants have
expressed understanding difficulties confronted to
CREAM terms, because the classification was not in
their native language, because of some ambiguities and
apparent redundancies.
These different elements also explain the encountered
difficulties in the search of consensus. Mutual
agreement has indeed only been obtained by vote.
This also emphasizes the complementarity of
different  points  of  view  and  the  interest  of  a
collective approach.
Conclusion
Results have shown the interest of CREAM for an in
depth search of causes, taking into account the context
by considering all the links between the different
elements that lead to an erroneous action. Thus to
preserve these links, quantitative presentation of results
has to be used with many care. If not, the risk might be
to end up in a disembodiment of data (Dekker, 2001).
Besides,  the  number  of  errors  does  not  constitute  a
single indicator of the security level reported to TCAS
events, the focus has to be in the understanding of the
context and of the multiple causes of these erroneous
actions. The first objective of ARCADES has been
reached in the sense that the final analyses based on
CREAM have enabled drawing recommendations in
order to limit hazardous consequences. These
recommendations concern several aspects of TCAS:
procedures, training and design.
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The second objective was to perform a first
explanatory study on the possibility of using some
CREAM principles in the analyses of aviation
incidents or accidents. Results have shown that an
adaptation of the classification has to be foreseen,
particularly concerning the communication aspects
and the person temporary related factors (stress,
fear…).  This adaptation has to be based on other
adaptation works of CREAM, such as Dijkstra's work
on Flight Operations (2005). Besides, this adaptation
has to be performed, based on the investigators
activity. Indeed, the quality of the resulting method
will not lie only in its ability to find causes but above
all in its usability.
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